Two months ago, I wrote how Boeing's Dreamliner had gone off track because the company had apparently conceived of it too much as a software project. The company thought it could offshore, split up, and reintegrate pieces and deal with any rough ends at assembly time. But the beta plane couldn't be flown.

The unions had warned that having too many pieces of the 787 built at different locations deleveraged the expertise—expensive, sure—that engineers and assembly-line workers had in Everett, Tukwila, and elsewhere. Boeing management saw those as typical job-saving statements; the company wanted to get worldwide incentives and differential labor savings, as well as have its partners carry the cost of production until successful delivery.

And it gambled and lost it all, including losing face. The New York Times today carries this statement:

"The company’s chief, W. James McNerney Jr., concedes that Boeing lost control of the process by farming out more design and production work than ever and not keeping close tabs on suppliers. He says the company is retaking control."

On the money side:

"Stock analysts estimate that the company initially planned to invest $8 billion to $10 billion in developing the project, but could end up spending $20 billion, including the penalties it will owe for delivery delays."

$10 to $12 billion would have probably covered the labor costs, no?