In late 2004, after President Bush won his second term, Erica and I helped co-write the Stranger's Urban Archipelago feature story, which made the case that cities were the future of the Democratic Party. 

(You probably won't be surprised to learn that we wrote a section called "Urban Independence" that spelled out green urbanism. And check it out: urbanism is definitely becoming a tenet of the Democratic Party these days). 

To retake the House, Democrats would not just need another great election year, like 2006 or 2008; they would need to build a much broader coalition than the one they currently focus on in presidential elections.

But I was always a little uncomfortable with the overall idea of the Urban Archipelago. Ceding that much turf struck me as a daffy electoral game plan.

And moreover, I liked the fight. I didn't want the Democratic Party to stop making a broad, popular case to finally convince suburban, exurban, and rural voters that liberal policies actually matched their interests. I saw the urban strategy as a retreat rather than taking on a debate that Democrats could and must win.

Even though I've savored Obama's two multicultural coalition wins, and even though his city-powered coalition seems to be the embodiment of the "unified theory" theory I'm keen on these days, it's actually the opposite.  

As evidenced by last Sunday's New York Times data-crunch piece on the pending congressional elections—and why Democrats are screwed—it looks like the archipelago strategy, good for presidential numbers, isn't a good one when it comes to controlling the legislature. And if you don't control the legislature, as we've seen, the White House wins don't get  you much. 

The NYT explains (and it's not about GOP cheating, i.e., gerrymandering): 

...Expanded Democratic margins in metropolitan areas are all but wasted in the House, since most of these urban districts already voted for Democrats. The result is that Democrats have built national and statewide majorities by making Democratic-leaning congressional districts even more Democratic, not by winning new areas that might turn congressional districts from red to blue.

 The role of partisan gerrymandering in all of this is hotly debated. It has indeed allowed Republicans to squeeze extra districts out of states like Michigan and Virginia, and strategically reinforce vulnerable incumbents. Those additional districts might make the difference between an insurmountable Republican advantage or a merely significant one. But gerrymandering is not responsible for the entire Republican edge in the House. 

The political scientists Jowei Chen, of the University of Michigan, and Jonathan Rodden, of Stanford University, estimate that gerrymandering costs Democrats about six to eight seats in the House. Even so, “by far the most important factor contributing to the Republican advantage,” Mr. Chen says, “is the natural geographic factor of Democrats’ being overwhelmingly concentrated in these urban districts, especially in states like Michigan and Florida.”

To retake the House, Democrats would not just need another great election year, like 2006 or 2008; they would need to build a much broader coalition than the one they currently focus on in presidential elections. They would need to attract the voters that some liberals thought they could abandon: the conservative Democrats of the South and Appalachia, where the vanquished Blue Dogs once reigned.

Still count me as an urbanist, just one that believes  car sharing, solar panels, bike lanes, and composting make sense everywhere. And, in fact, don't make sense at all in isolation.